Christine Korsgaard
Harvard University
"On Having a Good"
THU 21 MAR
UUW 324
5-7pm
abstract after the jump
abstract:
In a series of recent papers I have been arguing
that the concept “good-for” is prior to the concept of “good” (in the sense in
which final ends are good), and exploring the implications of that claim. One of those implications is that everything
that is good is good for someone. That
implication seems to fall afoul of our intuitions about certain cases, such as
the intuition that a world full of happy people and animals is better than a
world full of miserable ones, even if the people and animals are different in
the two cases, so that there is no one for whom the second world is
better. Such cases tempt people to think
that there must be impersonal goods, and that what it means to say that
something is good for you is that you are the one who “has” some impersonal
good. In this paper, I argue that if we
approach things in this way, it is impossible to say what the “having” consists
of, what relation it names. This leads
me to a discussion of various things we do mean by saying that something is
good for someone, how they are related to each other, and what sorts of
entities can “have a good.” Finally, I
explain why we think that a world full of happy people and animals is better
than a world full of miserable ones, even if the people and animals are
different in the two cases.
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